April 30, 2008
12:00 PM, 1507 Newell-Simon Hall
Title: Optimal size-based scheduling with selfish users
We consider the online single-server job scheduling problem. It is known that to minimize the average response time of jobs in this setting, at all times the job with the shortest remaining service time must be scheduled. This requires that the server knows about the sizes of all the jobs. However, in the scenario where the server does not know the sizes of the jobs whereas the jobs know their own sizes, the server can not rely on the jobs to truthfully reveal their sizes since a job may reduce its own response time by misreporting. While there are mechanisms in the literature that achieve truthful revelation, such mechanisms are based on imposing a tax and hence involve “real” money – which is not always desirable.
In this work, we propose a novel token based scheduling game. We prove that while playing the above scheduling game, all the jobs trying to minimize their own response time will end up implementing the shortest remaining service time first scheduling policy themselves.